LABOR LAW-PUBLIC

EMPLOYEES-COURT ADDS "PUBLIC INTEREST"

TO THE CRITERIA USED FOR DETERMINING APPROPRIATE BARGAINING

UNrrs-State v. Professional Association of New Jersey Department of Education, 64 N.J. 231, 315 A.2d 1 (1974).
In 1969, the New Jersey State Nurses' Association (NJSNA) filed
a representation petition with the New Jersey Public Employment
Relations Commission (P ERC).1 Although the nurses' original petition
sought representation of all registered nurses employed by the Department of Institutions and Agencies, initial state objections to the unit
prompted an amendment to the petition.2 Consequently, the petition
ultimately submitted by the nurses proposed two statewide units comprised of supervisory and non-supervisory employees respectively.3
In separate proceedings, hearings were scheduled to consider a
representation petition submitted by the Professional Association of
the New Jersey Department of Education. When a second education
association filed for representation, both petitions were joined to include all employees covered by the separate petitions.4 Over similar
1 State v. Professional Ass'n of N.J. Dep't of Educ., 64 N.J. 231, 236, 315 A.2d 1, 4
(1974).
2 Id. Following three prior hearings, the petition was amended substituting the
Jersey Nurses' Economic Security Organization (JNESO) for NJSNA. The amendment
was a result of the state's initial objection, which was "whether any of the nurses in the
proposed unit were supervisors and if so, where the line was to be drawn." Brief for
Petitioners-Appellants at 1, State v. Professional Ass'n of N.J. Dep't of Educ., 64 N.J. 231,
315 A.2d 1 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Petitioners-Appellants].
The state's objection concerning the supervisory status of the nurses was based upon
section 6(d) of the New Jersey Employer-Employee Relations Act which provides in part:
[PERC] shall decide in each instance which unit of employees is appropriate for
collective negotiation, provided that . . . no unit shall be appropriate which includes (1) both supervisors and nonsupervisors ...
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-6(d) (Supp. 1973-74).
3 State v. Professional Ass'n of N.J. Dep't of Educ., 64 N.J. 231, 236, 315 A.2d 1, 4
(1974). On March 11, 1970, the petition was again amended. In this amended petition,
NJSNA sought to represent a unit consisting of all supervisory registered nurses, while
JNESO sought representation of all non-supervisory registered nurses. Brief for PetitionersAppellants, supra note 2, at 2. This amendment eliminated the problem of distinguishing
between supervisory and non-supervisory nurses. Id.
The nurses' organizations sought units which were statewide in scope in order to
conform with a prior PERC decision which required statewide units with respect to state
employees. Id. See notes 57-64 infra and accompanying text.
4 State v. Professional Ass'n of N.J. Dep't of Educ., 64 N.J. 231, 238, 315 A.2d 1, 4-5
(1974). The Professional Association of New Jersey Department of Education requested
certification as bargaining agent for all "professional non-supervisory educational employees
in the Department of Education and the Katzenbach School for the Deaf." Id. at 237-38,
315 A.2d at 4. Four months later, a representation petition was also submitted by the
New Jersey Institutions and Agencies Education Association seeking certification as
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objections by the state,5 the hearing officers in both sets of proceedings
found that the proposed units were appropriate.6
Pursuant to the applicable PERC rule, 7 both sets of applications
bargaining representative for all "professional, non-supervisory educational employees of
the Department of Institutions and Agencies." Id. at 238, 315 A.2d at 4. Following the
joinder of these petitions, the scope of employees to be represented was enlarged to include
the professional educational employees in the Department of Higher Education, thereby
creating a statewide unit of approximately 1,200 persons. Id., 315 A.2d at 4-5.
5 Id. at 238, 315 A.2d at 5. The state argued that, under the statute, it would be in
the best interests of both the state and its employees to be represented by a unit composed
of all professional employees rather than by many separate units. Consequently, the state
proposed that
[t]he preferable unit . . . be one of all state-employed professionals, the requisite
"community of interest" being reflected by their common status as professionals
and the standards, attainments and status inherent therein as such.
Id.
6 The hearing officer in the educators' case emphasized the "community of interest"
among the employees in the proposed unit and found that
[t]he unit envisaged was regarded as "a logical functional group of such employees," having no conflicts of interest.
Id. at 239, 315 A.2d at 5. In the nurses' proceeding, the hearing officer, finding the statutory
requirement of "community of interest" satisfied by a unit limited to professional nurses,
pointed to
the historical recognition of nursing as a separate and distinct academic discipline,
its acceptance as a recognized profession and its maintenance of organizations, such
as Petitioner New Jersey State Nurses' Association, which are concerned with
internal self-discipline, training and the maintenance of standards and ethics on
both a national and state wide basis ....
Hearing Officer's Report and Recommendation, State of New Jersey, P.E.R.C. No. 68
(1971), in Brief for Petitioners-Appellants, Appendix, supra note 2, at Pal3. To further
support his finding that the nurses' unit was appropriate, the hearing officer referred to
previous discussions between the New Jersey State Nurses' Association and State
officials that have resulted in salary increases for all Registered Nurses employed
by the State ....
Id. at Pal4.
Furthermore, state licensing requirements for nurses and the significant number of
registered nurses to be included in the proposed professional unit were factors to be
considered when selecting an appropriate unit. Id.
7 N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 19:15-1.1(b) (Supp. 1973) provides:
Whenever the Executive Director deems it necessary in order to effectuate the
purposes of the Act or to avoid unnecessary costs or delay, he may order any
proceeding to be transferred to or consolidated with any other proceeding which
may have been instituted or he may in his discretion sever proceedings which
previously have been consolidated.
The consolidation of the nurses' and educators' cases with- three other actions properly
before PERC occurred one year after the nurses' case had been transferred to the
Commission. Brief for Petitioners-Appellants, supra note 2, at 2. The cases were consolidated in accordance with N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 19:15-3.2 (Supp. 1973) which provides:
(a) In any case in which it appears to the Executive Director that the proceeding raises questions which should be decided by the Commission, he may, at any
time, issue an order, to be effective after the close of the hearing and before decision, transferring the case to the Commission for decision.
(b) Such an order may be served on the parties upon the record of the
hearing.
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were consolidated for disposition before the Commission. Finding sufficient community of interest in the petitioning employees' professional
status, PERC rejected the recommendations of the hearing officers and
dismissed both cases."
On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Jersey, in State v. Professional Association of New Jersey Department of Education,9 affirmed
PERC's disposition of the case, holding that the Commission's requirement of broad, statewide bargaining units was well-founded based upon
both statutory unit selection criteria and "pervading public policy underlying the act."'10
Recognized as one of the most vital aspects of the collective bargaining process," the negotiating unit is generally defined in terms
of "appropriateness.' 1 2 After considering several formulations of the
8 State v. Professional Ass'n of N.J. Dep't of Educ., 64 N.J. 231, 239, 315 A.2d 1, 5
(1974). The Commission viewed the concept of "community of interest" as an elusive one,
encompassing several variable factors. Therefore, unit selection is "essentially a question
of weighing the facts in each case and deciding what will best serve the statutory policy."
State of New Jersey, P.E.R.C. No. 68, at 6 (1972).
The essence of PERC's decision rested upon its determination that
the characteristics of a particular profession should not be the determinant in
establishing units for negotiations. . . . but rather the more elementary fact that
they are simply professionals and on that basis alone to be distinguished from
other groups of employees.
Id. at 7.
9 64 N.J. 231, 315 A.2d 1 (1974). The appellate division had previously reversed the
PERC decision in a short, unreported per curiam opinion. State v. New Jersey State
Nurses' Ass'n & Jersey Nurses' Economic Security Organization, No. A-2878-71 (N.J. Super.
Ct., App. Div., June 1, 1973). The effect of the supreme court's decision was to reinstate
the PERC finding and overrule the appellate division's holding which was based substantially upon the hearing officer's report and recommendations. Id. at 1-2. Both the
nurses' and educators' cases reached the supreme court by way of certification, the latter
by the court's own motion while the case was still pending in the appellate division. State
v. New Jersey Nurses' Ass'n, 63 N.J. 557, 310 A.2d 472 (1973); State v. Professional Ass'n of
N.J. Dep't of Educ., 63 N.J. 562, 310 A.2d 477 (1973).
10 64 N.J. at 259, 315 A.2d at 16.
11 The importance of the bargaining unit issue was succinctly stated by Arvid
Anderson while addressing a symposium at the University of Kentucky:
"The determination of the appropriate bargaining unit is a critical issue in public
employment labor relations as it is in private employment. One over-all unit tends
to smother the legitimate interests of skilled, professional, craft and uniformed
employees. Excessive fragmentation strangles the bargaining process."
Begin & Chernick, PERC Decisions: Summary and Review, N.J. PUB. EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE
RELATIONS I (Bull. No. 3, June, 1970) (footnote omitted).
Other authors have also recognized the import of unit selection in collective bargaining
and its related problems. See Prasow, Unit Determination in Public EmploymentConcept and Problems, in INSTITUTE OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 60-61 (1969); Newman,
Major Problems in Public Sector Bargaining Units, 23 N.Y.U. CONF. LAB. 373, 377-78
(1971).
2601, at 6703 (1972). In the collective bargaining process, the
12 2 CCH LAB. L. REP.
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definition of the bargaining unit, one student of labor relations suggested the following as the most useful articulation of the concept:
A unit is a group of employees recognized by the employer, -or
by an
designated by an agency, as appropriate for representation
13
employee organization for purposes of bargaining.
Prior to the enactment of the nation's first comprehensive labor
relations act, unit determination was largely the result of confrontations between labor and management, unfettered by government intervention. 14 After the enactment of the Wagner Act,' 5 however, the
government became a participant in the unit selection process. 16 As a
result, on the federal level, pursuant to the limitations set forth in the
National Labor Relations Act 17 (NLRA), the National Labor Relations

Board (NLRB) has assumed the responsibility of determining the appropriate bargaining unit. The significance of this determination is
made apparent by other provisions of the NLRA which provide that
the unit certified 8 by the board is the exclusive bargaining agent for
all employees in that unit. 19
employees' interests are negotiated with the employer "by unions which represent the
employees grouped in what is called the 'appropriate bargaining unit.'" Id.
18 Prasow, supra note 11, at 60.
14 Id. The passage of the Wagner Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29
U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1970), was a significant measure in the determination of bargaining
units. Prior to the Act,
unit determination in the private sector was a function of bargaining power. The
bargaining units were rarely formed on the basis of rational criteria.
Begin & Chernick, supra note 11, at 3.
15 Wagner Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1970).
16 Prasow, supra note 11, at 60. With the introduction of government,
[t]he term "appropriate" took on greater significance for two reasons: (1) the value
judgments of government representatives could differ from those of the parties;
and (2) the very intervention of government could significantly affect the parties'
attitudes.
Id.
17 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1970) provides in part:
The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order to assure to employees
the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this subchapter, the
unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer
unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof: Provided, That the Board
shall not (1) decide that any unit is appropriate for such purposes if such unit
includes both professional employees and employees who are not professional
employees unless a majority of such professional employees vote for inclusion in
such unit; or (2) decide that any craft unit is inappropriate for such purposes on
the ground that a different unit has been established by a prior Board determination, unless a majority of the employees in the proposed craft unit vote against
separate representation ....
18 The Board's decision concerning "the appropriate unit for the purposes of collective
bargaining and the ascertainment by the Board of the bargaining representative" is necessary for certification. NLRB v. Prudential Ins. Co., 154 F.2d 385, 389 (6th Cir. 1946). See
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While the NLRA was enacted to resolve labor disputes in the
private sector, 20 many of the conflicts which precipitated the congressional response have re-emerged in the context of public employer-employee relations. 21 Labor relations in the public sector, however, are
influenced by unique considerations which are not a part of the private
collective bargaining process. 22 In the public sector, with the state
functioning as the employer, questions concerning the rights of the
state frequently emerge in labor disputes.2 3 In the past, the concept of
sovereign state power 24 has been invoked to restrict collective bargaining pressures in the public sector. 25 In the labor relations context, strict
also Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 146, 156 (1941); NLRB v. Ideal Laundry
& Dry Cleaning Co., 372 F.2d 307, 308 (10th Cir. 1967).
19 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970) provides in pertinent part:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining
by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be
the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit ....
After a representative has been selected by a majority of employees in the proposed unit,
the employer is prohibited from bargaining with any other organization. UAW v. NLRB,
394 F.2d 757, 762 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 831 (1968). See also NLRB v. SuCrest
Corp., 409 F.2d 765, 769 (2d Cir. 1969).
20 29 U.S.C. § 152 (1970). The Act, in defining the term "employer," specifically
excludes from its coverage
the United States ... or any State or political subdivision thereof . . . if no part
of the net earnings inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual
Id. § 152(2).
21 Imundo, Some Comparisons Between Public Sector and Private Sector Collective
Bargaining,24 LAB. L.J. 810, 810-11 (1973). See Wellington & Winter, Structuring Collective
Bargainingin Public Employment, 79 YA.E L.J. 805, 857-61 (1970).
22 Helsby, A Political System for a Political World-In Public Sector Labor Relations,
24 LAB. L.J. 504, 505 (1973). See also Imundo, supra note 21, at 810; Siegel & Kainen,
Political Forces in Public Sector Collective Bargaining, 21 CATH. U.L. REv. 581, 582-87
(1972). Various other commentaries have also dealt with the unique nature of the public
sector in relation to unit selection. See, e.g., Crowley, The Resolution of Representation
Status Disputes Under the Taylor Law, 37 FomRHAM L. REv. 517, 518-21 (1969); Edwards,
The Developing Labor Relations Law in the Public Sector, 10 DuQ. L. REv. 357, 367-69
(1972); Rock, The Appropriate Unit Question in the Public Service: The Problem of
Proliferation, 67 MicH. L. REv. 1001, 1005-08 (1969); Shaw & Clark, Determination of
AppropriateBargaining Units in the Public Sector: Legal and PracticalProblems, 51 ORE.
L. Rav. 151, 163-67 (1971); Sullivan, Appropriate Unit Determinations in Public Employee
Collective Bargaining, 19 MERCER L. REV. 402, 404-10 (1968).
23 Imundo, supra note 21, at 811; Helsby, supra note 22, at 505.
24 The sovereignty theory is based on the principle that
the government-employer, as the ultimate repose of all legitimate societal power,
cannot and should not be opposed by the countervailing power of labor unions.
Edwards, supra note 22, at 359. See also Imundo, supra note 21, at 811-12.
26 After noting that the sovereignty theory has frequently been used to restrict public
sector collective bargaining, a recent study found the following language representative
of the judicial justification for the doctrine:
"The courts have said that as a general rule collective bargaining has no place in
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application of the sovereignty theory places all authority to fix terms
and conditions of employment in the government and
[a]ny system of collective bargaining under which unions and government jointly determine the terms and conditions of employment
is incompatible with this doctrine. 26
Frequently criticized by legal scholars,2 7 the sovereignty theory was
severely undermined in 1962 when President Kennedy promulgated
Executive Order 10,988,28 which granted collective bargaining rights
government service. The employer is the whole people. This is a government of
law, not men. For the courts to hold otherwise . . .would be to sanction control
of governmental functions not by laws but by men. Such policy, if followed to its
logical conclusion, would inevitably lead to chaos."
2 ABA LABOR RELATIONS LAw SECTION, COMMITTEE REPORTS 285 (1973) (quoting from Dade
County v. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees, 157 So. 2d 176, 182 (Fla. 1963), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 971 (1965)).
26 Imundo, supra note 21, at 812 (footnote omitted). Another significant facet inherent
in the public sector is the role of the legislature, since the financial aspects of any agreement between public employees and their employers must eventually be endorsed by the
legislature. Helsby, supra note 22, at 505. Increased labor costs in public employment are
met by rising taxes. This is not a problem for consideration in the private sector, however,
since it is profit rather than service-oriented. Imundo, supra note 21, at 814. See also
Anderson, Public Employee Collective Bargaining: The Changing of the Establishment, 7
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 175, 179 (1971). For a discussion of the economic factors inherent in
the public sector, see Boynton, Industrial Collective Bargaining in the Public Sector: Because It's There?, 21 CATH. UL. REV. 568, 575-76 (1972).
Another facet of the sovereignty problem in public sector collective bargaining is the
prohibition against strikes. Imundo, supra note 21, at 815-17; Helsby, supra note 22, at
507-09. In recent years, this prohibition against strikes by public employees has been
extremely controversial. Consequently, several states have recently enacted legislation
which permits a limited right to strike, provided the strike will not endanger the public
health or safety. See, e.g., HAwAu REV. STAT. § 89-12(c) (Supp. 1973); MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. § 41-2209 (Supp. 1973); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1003 (Supp. 1973-74); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 1730(3) (Supp. 1973). For an informative analysis of the strike ban and its
lawfulness in the public sector, see Stevens, The Management of Labor Disputes in the
Public Sector, 51 ORE. L. REv. 191 (1971). For an exhaustive analysis of variant alternatives
to strikes in the public sector, see Comment, Collective Bargaining for Public Employees
and the Prevention of Strikes in the Public Sector, 68 MICH. L. REV. 260, 269-301 (1969).
See also Bernstein, Alternatives to the Strike in Public Labor Relations, 85 HARv. L. REv.
459, 469-75 (1971); Brown, Public Sector Collective Bargaining: Perspective and Legislative
Opportunities,15 WM. & MARY L. REv. 57, 72-76 (1973).
27 Arguments based on the concept of "sovereignty" as a viable basis of distinction
between the public and private sectors are no longer accorded the weight they once
received. For example, one commentator has stated:
[T]he application of a strict sovereignty notion-that governmental power can
never be opposed by employee organizations-is clearly a vestige from another era,
an era of unexpanded government when its proprietary role was not nearly so
important. The huge growth of government and its expansion into new "nonessential" services has produced basic changes in thought which make the foundations of any absolute notions of sovereignty obsolete.
Edwards, supra note 22, at 360 (footnote omitted).
28 3 C.F.R. 521 (1959-63 Comp.), 5 U.S.C. § 7301 (1970), revoked by, Exec. Order No
11,491, 3 C.F.R. 262 (Supp. 1973), 5 U.S.C. § 7301 (1970).
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to employees of the federal government. 29 In addition to recognizing
the organizational rights of federal public employees, the Order established labor guidelines similar to those governing the private sector
under the NLRA.80 Influenced by the federal example, many states
have enacted legislation dealing with public labor relations; 3' and by
1973, thirty-four jurisdictions had enacted statutes "either permitting
or requiring designated public employers to bargain collectively with
their employees.

32

In New Jersey, public employees are granted organizational rights
by the Constitution of 1947. 33 Because the constitutional provision
expressly distinguishes between public and private employees in its
recognition of the right to bargain collectively, 4 the legislature in 1966
created a commission to study the problem of public employee grievances. 35 The commission report, released in 1968, recommended establishment of an effective procedure for the resolution of disputes
involving terms and conditions of employment in the public sector.36
29 Exec. Order No. 10,988, § l(a), 3 C.F.R. 521 (1959-63 Comp.), 5 U.S.C. § 7301 (1970).
The Order provides that
[e]mployees of the Federal Government shall have, and shall be protected in
the exercise of, the right, freely and without fear of penalty or reprisal, to form,
join and assist any employee organization or to refrain from any such activity.
30 With the promulgation of Order 10,988, the federal government "established a
complete framework for management-employee relations similar to the one prevailing in
the private sector under the NLRA." Blair, State Legislative Control over the Conditions
of Public Employment: Defining the Scope of Collective Bargainingfor State and Municipal
Employees, 26 VAND. L. REV. r, 3 (1973) (footnote omitted).
31 Brown, supra note 26, at 60.
32 Blair, supra note 30, at 3 (footnote omitted). For a list of state statutes permitting
binding contracts to be negotiated between the parties covering matters agreed upon, see
id. at 3 n.18. See also D. OGAWA & J. NAJrTA, GUIDE TO STATUTORY PROVISIONS IN PUBLIC
SECTOR COLLECrIVE BARGAINING 63-66 (1973); Anderson, supra note 26, at 176-77; Goldberg,
Public Employee Developments in 1971, 95 MONTHLY LAB. REv. 56, 63 (1972).
33 N.J. CONSr. art. 1,
19 provides:
Persons in private employment shall have the right to organize and bargain
collectively. Persons in public employment shall have the right to organize, present
to and make known to the State, or any of its political subdivisions or agencies,
their grievances and proposals through representatives of their own choosing.
34 Id. See also Law of June 18, 1966, ch. 170, [1966] N.J. Laws 902, in which the
legislature recognized the constitutional distinction.
35 Law of June 18, 1966, ch. 170, [1966] N.J. Laws 902. The Study Commission was
continued by legislation adopted in 1967. Law of March 13, 1967, ch. 8, [1967] N.J. Laws
22. See also INTERIM REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE, in PUBLIC AND SCHOOL
EMPLOYEES' GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE STUDY COMM'N: FINAL REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE

33 (Jan. 9, 1968).
commission included in its recommendations the enactment of legislation
which would provide an efficient collective negotiation process in the public sector, exclusive
employee representation, and the voluntary resolution of disputes between public sector
labor and management. PUBLIC AND SCHOOL EMPLOYEES' GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE STUDY
COMM'N: FINAL REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE 18-26 (Jan. 9, 1968) [hereinafter cited as FINAL REPORT]. The commission also proposed a merger of the agencies
LEGISLATURE
36 The
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In 1968, the legislature responded to the commission report by enacting
the New Jersey Employer-Employee Relations Act,3 7 thereby supplementing the existing Labor Mediation Act.38 Commonly known as
the PERC Act, this legislation, in addition to recognizing public employees' rights to bargain collectively,3 9 established a separate agency
40
to administer the Act.
With respect to unit determination, the PERC Act empowers the
Commission to "decide in each instance which unit of employees is
appropriate for collective negotiation. ' 41 Elsewhere the Act directs that
[t]he negotiating unit shall be defined with due regard for the comsupervising both public and private sector labor disputes. Id. at 19-21. This recommendation, however, was rejected by the legislature, and separate agencies were later established
to resolve public and private disputes. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-5.1 (Supp. 1973-74).
37 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-1 et seq. (Supp. 1973-74). The Act evolved from Senate
Bill 746, which had been conditionally vetoed by Governor Hughes. The reasons for his
objections can be found in VETO MESSAGE OF GOVERNOR RICHARD J. HurHES CONCERNING
SENATE BILL No. 746, at 2-4 (1968). Nevertheless, the bill was passed by both houses over
his veto. Stark, The New Jersey Employer-Employee Relations Act of 1968, in RUTGERS
REPORT ON WORLD AFFAIRS I (Feb. 8, 1969).
8s N.J. Labor Mediation Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-1 et seq. (1965), as amended,
NJ. Employer-Employee Relations Act, NJ. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-1 et seq. (Supp. 1973-74).
39 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-5.3 (Supp. 1973-74). The Act states in pertinent part that
public employees shall have, and shall be protected in the exercise of, the right,
freely and without fear of penalty or reprisal, to form, join and assist any
employee organization or to refrain from any such activity ....
Id.
40 Id. § 34:13A-5.2. The agency entrusted with the settlement of disputes in the public
sector is the Division of Public Employment Relations. Within this Division, PERC is
responsible for supervising matters related to unit selection, elections, certification and
public employer-employee labor disputes. Id. §§ 34:13A-5.1, -5.2, -6(b) and (d).
The Study Commission recommended that the administrative agency be granted
wide authority to develop procedures appropriate to New Jersey's needs and to
retain sufficient flexibility to respond to circumstances which cannot be fully
anticipated.
FINAL REPORT, supra note 36, at 25.
41 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-6(d) (Supp. 1973-74). Additionally, the Act provides for
certain negative criteria in unit selection:
[E]xcept where dictated by established practice, prior agreement, or special circumstances, no unit shall be appropriate which includes (1) both supervisors and nonsupervisors, (2) both professional and nonprofessional employees unless a majority
of such professional employees vote for inclusion in such unit or, (3) both craft
and noncraft employees unless a majority of such craft employees vote for inclusion
in such unit.
Id. The Act also excludes the superintendent of a school from coverage under the Act, and
prohibits a unit consisting of both policemen and non-policemen. Id. § 34:13A-5.3. See
County of Gloucester v. Public Employment Relations Comm'n, 107 N.J. Super. 150, 158-59,
257 A.2d 712, 717 (App. Div. 1969), aff'd per curiam, 55 N.J. 333, 262 A.2d 1 (1970), in
which PERC determined that because county corrections officers have the power and
authority of policemen, they are deemed policemen for purposes of the statute and cannot
join a union consisting of any members other than policemen.
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munity of interest among the employees concerned, but the comrecognition and unit
mission shall not intervene in matters of
42
definition except in the event of a dispute.
In conformity with the pervasive desire to establish and maintain a high
degree of flexibility on the part of PERC, 43 the draftsmen of the Act did
not attempt to define "community of interest." 44 Consequently, PERC
was charged with the duty of developing the concept on a case-by-case
45
basis.
Representative unit determination cases that have been considered
by PERC under the statute reveal an interesting evolution in the
application of the community of interest concept in situations where
there exist competing proposals for broad state or county-wide units on
one hand, and smaller single-facility units on the other. In Camden
County Board of Chosen Freeholders,46 the Commission had occasion
to consider representation petitions submitted by two Camden County
employee organizations. 47 Initially, one of the groups sought representation of a unit composed of all blue-collar employees who worked at
the Lakeland Institutions, a hospital complex located in Gloucester
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-5.3 (Supp. 1973-74).
See note 40 supra (relating to FNAL REPORT). During public hearings held a year
after the PERC Act's enactment, the flexibility approach to unit selection was again
voiced:
ifihe law now is vague and intentionally vague, so that the Commission can, on
a case to case basis, determine what is the best or an appropriate unit to bargain
collectively for employees of a particular group.
1 Public Hearings Before NJ. Senate and Assembly Comms. on State Gov't on Public
Employer-Employee Relations Law 46 (1970) (remarks of Thomas Parsonnet) [hereinafter
cited as Public Hearings on State Gov't].
44 See Board of Educ. v. Wilton, 57 N.J. 404, 420, 273 A.2d 44, 52 (1971). Although
the Act does not define the term, one commentator suggests that
[c]ommunity of interest is a term of art which probably defies a full fledged
definition but the essence of it is that the employment relationship manifests
certain characteristics that tend to identify and separate employees into a group
having such similar interests that they are more susceptible to successful negotiations than disparate interests would be.
Nelligan, PERC Decisions: A Review, in PERC ONE YEAR LATER 16 (1970). It is significant
to note that the NLRA does not define the term "community of interest" with respect to
its unit selection criteria. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1970). See also Continental Baking Co., 99
N.L.R.B. 777, 782 (1952); D. OGAWA & J. NAJITA, supra note 32, at 2.
45 Coleman, A Perspective on Public Employee Unionism in New Jersey, 4 RUTGERSCAMDEN L.J. 289, 298 (1973). This approach has also been recognized by the judiciary.
Board of Educ. v. Wilton, 57 N.J. 404, 420, 273 A.2d 44, 52 (1971) (by implication). See also
2 Public Hearings on State Gov't, supra note 43, at 53A (remarks of Howard Simonoff).
46 P.E.R.C. No. 28 (1969).
47 The two organizations petitioning for representation were the American Federation
of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFL-CIO) and Camden Council No. 10, N.J.
Civil Service Association. Id. at 1.
42
43
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Township. 4 The second organization, however, proposed a countywide unit of blue and white-collar employees with the exclusion of
workers employed by the Highway Department. 49 During the course
of the proceedings, all parties stipulated that in the event a unit limited
to Lakeland alone was selected, the unit should be limited to only those
job classifications found at that institution.50
Characterizing the unit agreed upon as "gerrymandered," 51 the
Commission concluded that the parties' stipulation ignored the employees' community of interest. 52 After rejecting the stipulated unit,
the Commission proceeded to consider the appropriateness of the
county-wide unit which included both blue and white-collar employees,
and then a unit restricted to blue-collar workers at Lakeland Institutions only. The Commission ultimately found that both units were
appropriate and directed an election to determine whether the Lakeland Institutions' employees desired combination with other employees
of the county. 53
In finding the Lakeland unit to be appropriate over the county's
54
objection that a limited unit would create administrative difficulties,
the Commission placed great reliance on the distinct community of
interest of the Lakeland employees. Observing that the hospital workers' unique service "set[s] them off from other County employees," 55
the Commission concluded:
All of these factors

. . .

lend support to the conclusion that the em-

ployees of Lakeland Institutions do have a community of interest
48

Id. at 2-3.

49 Id.

at 4.

50 Id. at 3. Specifically excluded by the petitioning parties were "those job classifica-

tions found both at Lakeland Institutions and elsewhere in the County." Id. See also
Harper, What Is the Unit Appropriate for Collective Negotiations?, N.J. PUB. EMPLOYEREMPLOYEE RELATIONS

3, 4 (Bull. No. 12, Nov., 1972); Nelligan, supra note 44, at 17.

51 P.E.R.C. No. 28, at 3.
52 Id. In disposing of the case, PERC failed to recognize
such a gerrymandered unit which includes some employees but which excludes
others to be consistent with the statutory requirement that the Commission give
due r gard for the community of interest among the employees concerned.
Id. at 5. See also Harper, supra note 50, at 4; Nelligan, supra note 44, at 17.
53 P.E.R.C. No. 28, at 8-9.
at 5. It was the county's opinion that "such a unit would cause untold
54 Id.
administrative problems and would lead to competition among employee groups." Id.
55 Id. at 6. Other factors existed which demonstrated the separate and distinct
"community of interest" between the Lakeland employees and other employees of the
county. The working conditions at Lakeland varied from anywhere else in the county;
grievances of Lakeland employees as well as "such matters as hire, discharge and discipline"
were handled by Lakeland. Id. Furthermore, no employee was subject to transfer from
Lakeland "other than in emergencies of a temporary nature." Id.
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separate and distinct from that of other County employees and
that
56
Lakeland Institutions does constitute an appropriate unit.
Subsequent PERC decisions, however, indicate that the Commission's conception of community of interest is becoming more expansive
in order to select broad, statewide units, rather than smaller, local
units of the type advised in Camden County. In State of New Jersey
(Neuropsychiatric Institute),57 decided in 1971, the Commission was
faced with the consolidated petitions of several employee groups concerning the representation of persons employed by the State of New
Jersey in various institutions and government departments. 58 After
reviewing the proposals of the various petitioning organizations, which
included single institution units and units confined to particular departments within institutions, 9 the Commission, with specific reference
to Camden County, determined that the units in question, regardless
of their composition, should be statewide in scope.6 0 Conceding that
there is "a kind of community of interest"' among workers at the same
institution, the Commission nevertheless considered the centralized
nature of the state employer and the consequent need for statewide
uniformity, 2 and found a more general form of common interest:
But [institutional community of interest] does not negate the possibility of a stronger, broader and higher level of common interest
which threads through various administrative units and which de56 Id. The Commission based its holding upon its interpretation of section 5.3 of the

Act:
The Act does not require the Commission to find the most appropriate unit or the
only appropriate unit but calls for a finding that, after giving due regard for the
community of interest among the employees concerned, an [sic] unit is an appropriate unit.
Id. at 7 (emphasis in original). See also Harper, supra note 50, at 4.
57 P.E.R.C. No. 50 (1971).
58 Id. at 3.
59 Id. at 5.
60 Id. at 10.
61 Id.
62 Id. In support of its determination that statewide units, rather than smaller units,
are appropriate, the Commission listed as its reasons
[t]he administrative make-up of the Employer; the concentration, at the highest
level, of responsibility for policy and authority to regulate and implement the
most significant aspects of labor relations; the obligation implicit in the concept
of Civil Service to insure equality of employment opportunity and uniformity of
treatment once employed, and in consequence of that obligation, the basic consistency of terms and conditions of employment throughout the state for employees engaged in essentially like functions-and for certain terms such as fringe
benefits, a consistency regardless of function ....
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rives from the fact that employee terms and conditions in greatest
measure are established by a central authority .... 63

Finding units of less than statewide scope inappropriate for purposes
of collective bargaining, the Commission established three units of non-

professional, nonsupervisory employees.

4

Although community of interest in the representation context has

not been a frequently litigated issue in the New Jersey courts, several
cases concerning this question evidence a departure from the traditional
desire to give the wishes of the employees great weight in the determina66
tion of bargaining units.65 In Board of Education v. Wilton, administrative employees of the West Orange Board of Education formed a
negotiating unit and requested employer recognition. The Board recognized the unit, but excluded "'[d]irectors who act in supervisory capacity'" over the administrators in the unit. 67 When the Director of
Elementary Education sought inclusion in the unit, the Board refused
the request on the ground that the Director's status as a supervisor of

other unit employees required her exclusion. 68 On appeal, the supreme
Id. at 11.
Id. at 15. The Commission found that three units would be appropriate: Health,
Care and Rehabilitation Services; Operations, Maintenance and Service; and Craft
Employees.
Prior PERC decisions demonstrate the various criteria which have developed in
defining "community of interest." E.g., City of Orange, P.E.R.C. No. 21, at 3-5 (1969) (a
department-wide unit was approved due to separate administrations, lack of employee
interchange, and unique department job classifications); Newark Bd. of Educ., P.E.R.C.
No. 20, at 2-3 (1969) (various professional disciplines were combined with teachers based
upon their functional relationship and the necessary corollation of their duties); Garfield
Bd. of Educ., P.E.R.C. No. 16, at 2 (1969) (nurses and teachers were combined in a unit
distinct from other county employees due to their similar working conditions, i.e., same
hours of work, holidays, etc,); Town of Nutley, P.E.R.C. No. 12, at 2 (1969) (two bluecollar department-wide units were established based on the lack of interchangeability
between the departments, the differing job classifications, and the distinct administrations
of the two departments); Perth Amboy Bd. of Educ., P.E.R.C. No. 3, at 3 (1969) (a professional unit was adopted based upon the desires of the parties in the representation
dispute); State Colleges of New Jersey, P.E.R.C. No. 1, at 3 (1969) (each of the six state
colleges was deemed an appropriate unit because of its distinct autonomy from the
others in its day-to-day operation). See notes 45-55 supra and accompanying text (discussing Camden County); see also Begin & Chernick, supra note 11, at 5-6; Harper, supra
note 50, at 4; Nelligan, supra note 44, at 16-18.
65 Begin & Chernick, supra note 11, at 6.
66 57 N.J. 404, 273 A.2d 44 (1971).
67 Id. at 407, 273 A.2d at 45. Included within the unit were "principals, assistant
principals, subject matter directors, and administrative assistants." Id.
68 Id. at 407-08, 273 A.2d at 45. It was the Board's contention that the Director's
status necessitated her exclusion since her position "invested her with such supervision
over the other employees included therein and such intimacy with the managerial aspects
of the Board's operation." Id. at 408, 273 A.2d at 45.
63
64
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court recognized the potential divergence between the interests of
supervisors and their subordinates. It held that when either actual or
potential conflicts of interest exist between members of a proposed unit,
a lack of community of interest is shown, rendering the proposed unit
inappropriate under the statute. 9 In evaluating the Director's desire to
be included in the unit, a significant factor in PERC's disposition of the
case, 7 0 the court said:
The determinative factor, so far as Miss Wilton is concerned, in
ascertaining the appropriateness of a unit is neither what she wants
nor what the public employer wants, but rather whether her inclusion in the unit will serve and not subvert the purpose of the
Act, i.e., establishment and promotion of fair and harmonious employer-employee relations in the public service. 71
Thus Wilton indicates that as far as the New Jersey supreme court is
concerned, while employee desires are to be considered, the broad
purposes of the Act must be accorded controlling weight in public em72
ployee unit determination.
In Professional Association, all parties recognized the statutory requirement mandating consideration of community of interest in unit
selection under the PERC Act. The problem confronting the court,
however, was the proper scope of the term with respect to occupational
classifications, and the proper weight to be given to that "community"
by the Commission in determining the appropriate unit.
Although both groups of employees were willing to accept statewide bargaining units, the nurses' and educators' organizations sought
Id. at 427, 273 A.2d at 56.
Id. at 416, 273 A.2d at 50.
71 Id.
72 Gross, Unit Determination and New Jersey Court Decisions, in PUBLIC SEcroR
LABOR RELATIONS IN THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY 13 (1971), in which the author observed that
in Wilton
[t]he Supreme Court recognized that consent of the employee is an element to be
considered but is not controlling. The test is not, as far as any individual employee
is concerned, what the employee wants or the public employer wants, but what
will serve not to subvert the purpose of [the PERC Act], that is, to "establish
fair and harmonious employer-employee relations in the public service."
Id. Lower courts have also followed the Wilton approach to the supervisory problem. In
Elizabeth Fire Officers Ass'n v. City of Elizabeth, 114 N.J. Super. 33, 274 A.2d 817 (App.
Div. 1971), the court, with explicit reference to Wilton, remanded the case to PERC for
fact finding on the question of whether the supervisory status of the chief and deputy
chief of the fire and police departments compelled their exclusion from the proposed
negotiating unit. Id. at 38, 274 A.2d at 820.
In the private sector, the desire of the employees is an extremely influential factor in
unit selection. When factors exist which support both a larger and a separate unit, it is
often the desire of the employees that determines which unit will ultimately be selected.
See 2 CCH LAB. L REsP.
2605, at 6708 (1972). See also Begin & Chernick, supra note 11,
69
70
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unit recognition based upon distinct professional identity.75 The nurses,
in particular, argued that the community of interest in their profession,
coupled with their past bargaining success, required the exclusion of
professionals generally. 74 The state, however, viewed the community of
interest concept much more expansively, and argued that the requisite
mutuality was satisfied by the petitioners' common status as professionals. Consequently, rather than advocating separate units based upon
distinct professional identity, the state suggested a broad unit composed
75
of substantially all the state's professional employees.
In considering Professional Association, the court recognized at
the outset that the community of interest concept was " 'somewhat
elusive.' ",76 Acknowledging the absence of a statutory definition for the
term, the nurses pointed to the experience of the NLRB, and urged
that the case law developed under the NLRA compelled recognition of
the proposed units. 77 Responding to this contention, the court observed
at 3; Kruger, The Appropriate Bargaining Unit for Professional Nurses, 19 LAB. L.J. 3, 4
(1968).
73 64 N.J. at 236-39, 315 A.2d at 4-5.
74 Id. at 237, 315 A.2d at 4. The petitioning nurses' organization noted that
all registered professional nurses possess similar basic skills, are required to
perform similar duties under substantially the same conditions, generally have
the same basic educational requirements, must take the same examination in
order to become registered, and share similar problems.
Brief for Petitioners-Appellants, supra note 2, at 4. The nurses also argued that their
prior bargaining history should be taken into consideration by PERC and the courts when
determining unit selection. Id. at 18. See note 6 supra. Both the employee organization's
history of collective bargaining and the extent to which employees have organized are
important criteria to be considered in the unit selection process under the NLRA. 2 CCH
2605, 6707-08 (1972). See also Begin & Chernick, supra note 11, at 3. Kruger,
LAB. L. REP.
supra note 72, at 4. It should be noted, however, that pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(5)
(1970), "the extent to which the employees have organized shall not be controlling."
Federal public employees are also precluded from relying solely upon organization status
in unit determination, Exec. Order No. 11,491, § 10(b), 3 C.F.R. 267 (Supp. 1973), 5 U.S.C.
§ 7301 (1970), as amended, Exec. Order No. 11,616, 3 C.F.R. 202 (Supp. 1971), 5 U.S.C.
§ 7301 (1970).
75 See note 5 supra. Brief for Respondent at 37-38, State v. Professional Ass'n of N.J.
Dep't of Educ., 64 N.J. 231, 315 A.2d 1 (1974).
At the time of the Professional Association decision, the state employee bargaining
units numbered twelve. 64 N.J. at 240 n.l, 249-50 n.3; 315 A.2d at 6, 11. For an overview of
collective bargaining for New Jersey state employees, see Stark, Bargaining in New Jersey
State Government: A Status Report as of the End of 1973, to be published in NEW JERSEY
PuB. EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONS (1974).
76 64 N.J. at 245, 315 A.2d at 9 (quoting from Board of Educ. v. Wilton, 57 N.J. 404,
420, 273 A.2d 44, 52 (1971)).
77 64 N.J. at 245, 315 A.2d at 8-9. The nurses' organizations noted that "[u]nder the
Federal standard it is clear thaf the Commission's decision would be completely indefensible and is absolutely contrary to law." Brief for Petitioners-Appellants, supra note
2, at 10.

1974]

NO TES

that the administration of the federal act has been marked by great
flexibility, and with particular reference to unit selection, that the
United States Supreme Court has cautioned against the establishment of
absolute rules of law.7 8 In view of the degree of discretion reposed in
the Board in this context, the court concluded that the NLRB decisions had little precedential value in other federal cases, and were to
be accorded even less weight in the substantially different area of public
79
sector labor relations.
In the court's view, however, there were far more compelling reasons for looking beyond the NLRB experience in order to resolve the
instant controversy. The policy of the national act emphasizes the
protection of the rights of industrial employees and ensures them
"'the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by' the act."8' 0
In contrast, the policy expressly set forth by the legislature in the PERC
Act requires consideration of the broader interests of the public in
resolving disputes under the Act:
[T]he interests and rights of the consumers and the people of the
State, while not direct parties [to labor disputes], should always be
considered, respected and protected ....81
Having concluded that the petitioners' reliance on federal standards of unit determination was misplaced, the court looked elsewhere
for guidance. Finding a "strong analogy" between the case at bar and
82
New York's determination of bargaining units in the public sector,
the court examined the New York public employment act83 and dis4
covered more specific criteria for the selection of appropriate units.
78 See, e.g., Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485 (1947) in which the Court
stated with reference to the NLRB unit selection process:
The issue as to what unit is appropriate for bargaining is one for which no
absolute rule of law is laid down by statute, and none should be by decision.
It involves of necessity a large measure of informed discretion ....
Id. at 491.
79 64 N.J. at 247, 315 A.2d at 9.
80 Id. (quoting from 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1970)). See note 106 infra for a discussion of
the "an appropriate unit" policy in the private sector. This policy promotes the employees'
choice of bargaining representative and thus further encourages fragmentation of units.
See also Gross, supra note 72, at 15, which points out that the NLRA is basically
employee-oriented.
81 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-2 (Supp. 1973-74).
82 64 N.J. at 247, 315 A.2d at 10.
83 N.Y. Civ. SEav. LAw § 200 et seq. (McKinney 1973). This Act is commonly referred
to as the Taylor Law.
84 The Taylor Law provides three criteria for fixing appropriate negotiating units:
(a) the definition of the unit shall correspond to a community of interest
among the employees to be included in the unit;
(b) the officials of government at the level of the unit shall have the power
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After reviewing the Act and the Commission's recommendations which
preceded it, the court held that the New York provision which requires
consideration of the "joint responsibilities of the public employer and
public employees to serve the public"8 15 in the unit selection process was
"clearly implicit in our own statute."86
In applying this standard, the New York Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) has taken the position that the Act requires the
selection of a small number of broad, comprehensive negotiating units.
In State of New York,8 7 for example, PERB was called upon to consider
negotiating units for 167,000 state workers employed in over 3,700 job
classifications categorized in ninety occupational groupings., In response to the state's request for three broad units, the petitioning employee organizations sought twenty-five separate units, including one
for nurses.8 9 Although PERB declined to combine all of the petitioning
employee groups into a single unit,90 the Board stressed that the Act
required the designation of the smallest possible number of units that
would provide the employer with "a comprehensive and coherent pattern for collective negotiations." 91 Consequently, PERB found that
five bargaining units were appropriate. 92 PERB's disposition of the
93
case was ultimately sustained by the New York court of appeals.
to agree, or to make effective recommendations to other administrative authority
or the legislative body with respect to, the terms and conditions of employment
upon which the employees desire to negotiate; and
(c) the unit shall be compatible with the joint responsibilities of the public
employer and public employees to serve the public.
Id. §§ 207(1)(a)-(c).
85

Id. § 207(l)(c).

64 N.J. at 248, 315 A.2d at 10.
1 P.E.R.B.
1-399.85 (1968).
88 Id. at 3230, 3233.
89 Id. at 3227-29.
90 Id. at 3230. It was the opinion of the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB)
86

87

that
[t]he enormity of this diversity of occupations and the great range in the
qualifications requisite for employment in these occupations would preclude
effective and meaningful representation in collective negotiations if all such
employees were included in a single unit. The occupational differences found
here give rise to different interests and concerns in terms and conditions of
employment. This, in turn, would give rise to such conflicts of interest as to
outweigh those factors indicating a community of interest.
Id.
91 Id. at 3231.
92 PERB determined that the following units would be appropriate: (1)Operational
Services Unit; (2) Security Services Unit; (3)Institutional Services Unit; (4) Administrative
Services Unit; and (5) a Professional, Scientific and Technical Services Unit. Id. at 3231-32.
93 Following PERB's disposition of the case, the Civil Service Employee Association
sought judicial review of the Board's choice of five bargaining units. Since the Board
rejected the single unit requested by the state negotiating committee, and selected units
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Relating the Board's resolution of State of New York to the present
dispute, the Professional Association court reiterated the " 'considerable parallelism' "94 between the two Acts and reasoned that the PERBapproved units in State of New York were essentially the same as those
advocated by the state in the instant case, and that PERC, by clear
implication, approved the state's unit formula.96 Since the foundation
of PERB's resolution of State of New York was grounded upon the need
for comprehensive rather than fragmented units"6 in the public sector,
the court found it necessary to evaluate the utility of this approach in
terms of the public interest.
In considering the fragmentation issue, the court identified a
distinct trend in recent legislation to stress the public interest and to
avoid undue fragmentation in public sector bargaining units. This
tendency has been reflected in both recent state public employment
statutes and federal directives. 97 The statutes of two states, Pennsylvania
and Kansas, are explicit in requiring the consideration of over-fragmentation in unit determination," and one state, Hawaii, goes even
not requested by any party to the proceeding, the petitioner argued that the Board's
choice was "capricious, and not supported by substantial evidence." Civil Serv. Employees
Ass'n v. Helsby, 32 App. Div. 2d 131, 133-34, 300 N.Y.S.2d 424, 426 (1969). In rejecting this
contention, the appellate division stated:
It cannot be said that the board's determination of the appropriate units lacks
evidentiary support, or was arbitrary or capricious, or that the board deviated
from the statutory standards.
Id,at 134, 300 N.Y.S.2d at 427. The decision of the appellate division was affirmed by the
court of appeals in a per curiam opinion. Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n v. Helsby, 25 N.Y.2d
842, 250 N.E.2d 731, 303 N.Y.S.2d 690 (1969).
94 64 N.J. at 249-50, 315 A.2d at 11 (quoting from Burlington County Evergreen Park
Mental Hosp. v. Cooper, 56 N.J. 579, 596, 267 A.2d 533, 543 (1970)).
95 64 N.J. at 249, 315 A.2d at 11.
96 Fragmentation is the creation of numerous bargaining units based upon various
distinctions-occupational, institutional, departmental, etc. Consequently, the parochial
nature of the units tends to increase costs and time spent in negotiations by the public
employer and the employee representatives. See note 63 supra for early PERC decisions
demonstrating the results of such an approach.
97 64 N.J. at 250, 315 A.2d at 11.
98 The Pennsylvania Public Employment Relations Act provides that the Labor
Relations Board shall
[t]ake into consideration but shall not be limited to the following .. .(ii) the
effects of over-fragmentization.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.604(l)(ii) (Supp. 1973-74). See Comment, Determination of the
Bargaining Unit under the New Pennsylvania Public Employee Relations Act, 75 DiCK.
L. REv. 490, 498, 502 (1971). For a study of unit selection in Pennsylvania pursuant to its
new law, see Schmidman, Collective Bargaining in Pennsylvania's Public Sector: The First
Three Months, 24 LAB. L.J. 755, 756-58 (1973).
Similarly, the Kansas statute mandates that
the board ... shall take into consideration ...(5) the effects of overfragmentation
and the splintering of a work organization ....
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further by legislating small numbers of statewide bargaining units.99
In a less direct fashion, the federal government has dealt with the
problem by amending the executive order regulating federal employees.
Employing language similar to that used by New York, Executive Order
11,491100 directs that bargaining units "promote effective dealings and
efficiency of agency operations.''0 Examining the justifications behind
the large unit policy, the court observed that the state's ability to
negotiate effectively increases when the number of bargaining units is
minimized, 10 2 and thus concluded that if the state employer was forced
to negotiate with too many separate employee bargaining units, "the
whole process could well bog down on the public employer's end of
the negotiating process."'10

3

In the court's view, this would frustrate the

PERC Act's policy of "'prompt settlement of labor disputes.' "104
In sustaining the PERC unit determination in Professional Association, the court conceded that the units sought by the petitioning
organizations were'not totally inappropriate. 0 5 The court, however, in
§ 75-4327(e)(5) (Supp. 1973). For a comprehensive listing of legislative
enactments including those specifying avoidance of overfragmentization as a criteria for
unit selection, see D. OGAWA & J. NAJITA, supra note 32, at 67-69.
99 The Hawaii public employees act has designated thirteen statewide units. HAWAII
REv. STAT. § 89-6 (Supp. 1973). It is interesting to note that a separate unit is provided
for "[rjegistered professional nurses." Id. § 89-6(a)(9).
100 3 C.F.R. 262 (Supp. 1973), 5 U.S.C. § 7301 (1970). These Orders, issued by
President Nixon, updated the earlier Kennedy Order of 1962. See notes 27-28 supra and
accompanying text. The new Orders provided that unit selection be made by the
Assistant Secretary for Labor-Management Relations. Furthermore, criteria were added
for determining appropriate bargaining units, and procedures were established for
grievance arbitration and the resolution of impasses. See Blair, supra note 30, at 3 nn.15
& 16; Brown, supra note 26, at 59-60; Coleman, supra note 45, at 293-94.
101 Exec. Order No. 11,491, § 10(b), 3 C.F.R. 267 (Supp. 1973), 5 U.S.C. § 7301 (1970).
For a discussion of the added criterion's purpose to avoid overfragmentization, see Shaw
& Clark, supra note 22, at 160-61.
102 64 N.J. at 250-51, 315 A.2d at 12 (citing sources found in note 21 supra as related
to unit selection). The court further pointed out that larger units assist the public employer "to make or effectively recommend negotiating decisions," and the newly-created
Governor's Office of Employee Relations "has reduced the magnitude of the administrative
problems inherent in conducting negotiations for the State as an employer." Id. at 251,
315 A.2d at 12.
103 Id. at 252, 315 A.2d at 12.
104 Id. (quoting from N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-2 (Supp. 1973-74)).
105 64 N.J. at 252, 315 A.2d at 12. The court also cited a private sector case, Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corp., 108 N.L.R.B. 591 (1954), "establishing a separate unit for
nurses in an industrial concern." 64 N.J. at 252, 315 A.2d at 12-13. In addition, the court
did not rule out the possibility that circumstances in the future might necessitate the
formation of a unit composed of less than all professional employees.Id. at 253 n.6, 315
A.2d at 13. It is interesting to note that subsequent to PERC's disposition of Professional
Association, the Commission approved a bargaining unit for all professional employees
performing educational services at the state's institutions of higher education, thus enKAN. STAT. ANN.
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response to the nurses' contention that PERC erroneously insisted on
the most appropriate unit when all that is required is approval of an
10 7
appropriate unit, 10 6 found this argument "difficult to understand"'
and held that
we have no doubt that under our act PERC was under a duty to
make a determination as to the most appropriate unit.108
Having concluded that the Commission must select the most appropriate unit in discharge of its responsibility under the Act, the
dorsing a unit based on distinct occupational identity. See Paterson State Fed'n of College
Teachers, P.E.R.C. No. 72 (1972).
106 Brief for Petitioners-Appellants, supra note 2, at 10-16. The petitioning nurses'
organization, stressing that PERC is merely required to find that a unit is appropriate,
stated:
"There is nothing in the statute which requires that the unit for bargaining
be the only appropriate unit or the ultimate unit or the most appropriate unit;
the Act requires only that the unit be 'appropriate.' It must be appropriate to
ensure the employees in each case 'the fullest freedom in exercising the rights
guaranteed by this Act."'
Id. at 10 (quoting from Morand Bros. Beverage Co., 91 N.LR.B. 409, 418 (1950)) (emphasis
in original). The federal courts have also employed this approach to unit selection. See
MPC Restaurant Corp. v. NLRB, 481 F.2d 75, 78 (2d Cir. 1973); Ochsner Clinic v. NLRB,
474 F.2d 206, 209 (5th Cir. 1973). See also Crowley, supra note 22, at 518; Shaw & Clark,
supra.note 22, at 163-64. For the application of this policy in the public sector under Exec.
Order No. 10,988, see King, The Taylor Act-Experiment in Public Employer-Employee
Relations, 20 SRv.AcusE L. Rzv. 1, 15 & n.56 (1968); Prasow, supra note 11, at 60.
The Professional Association court, referring to section 9(b)(2), refuted the nurses' contention by stating that the NLRA leaves the Board "'free to select that unit which it deems
best suited to accomplish the statutory purposes.'" 64 N.J. at 255, 315 A.2d at 14 (quoting
from 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(2) (1970)) (footnote omitted). To support its argument that the
most appropriate unit policy is also applicable in federal labor law, the court cited NLRB
v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 270 F.2d 167, 172-73 (4th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 943
(1960), and Executive Bd., Local 1302 v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 339 F. Supp. 613, 621-22
(D. Conn. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 477 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1973). At least one author
has agreed with this view and has suggested that broader, more inclusive units are favored
over smaller units. See Hall, The Appropriate Bargaining Unit: Striking a Balance Between Stable Labor Relations and Employee Free Choice, 18 CASE W. Rxs. L. Rxv. 479,
537-38 (1967). Since "[c]ollective bargaining is to be fostered in appropriate units, and the
more appropriate the unit, the better," individual free choice as to bargaining representative must yield to the policy of collective bargaining when the units in question are
equally appropriate. Id. at 538.
107 64 N.J. at 255, 315 A.2d at 14.
108 Id. at 257, 315 A.2d at 15. It was the opinion of the ProfessionalAssociation court
that "in event of a dispute the Commission shall 'decide in each instance which unit of employees is appropriate for collective negotiation'" and that "[f]ormal hearings may be
conducted 'to determine the appropriate unit.'" Id. (emphasis by court) (citations omitted).
The court concluded:
[Tihe Commission had no choice but to determine the unit it deemed best and
accordingly to designate either a unit proposed by one of the parties or to specify
one of its own conception, as guided by the evidence, its expertise and the statutory criteria.
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court summarized its views concerning the weight to be given to community of interest in unit determination disputes. What is required by
the statute is " 'due regard for', not exclusive reliance upon such community of interest."' 1 9 In placing the mutuality requirement in perspective, the court cautioned that the interests of the employer and
the public are also relevant factors. 110 Acknowledging the element of
agency expertise involved, and applying the appropriate standards for
review,"' the court was unable to conclude that PERC's resolution of
the dispute was either arbitrary or unreasonable.
The judicial endorsement of the Commission's unit selection in
ProfessionalAssociation represents both a change in the interpretation
of the Act's unit determination criteria, and a new judicial construction
of the "elusive" community of interest concept. Since Camden County
and Wilton, it has been clear that employee preference alone is not controlling in the unit selection process. In ProfessionalAssociation, however, PERC and the court have further diluted the employees' desires
when structuring bargaining units. The result reached by the Commission, which PERC couched in terms of a broader definition of
community of interest, has been ratified by a more direct judicial approach. Undoubtedly, either approach can vindicate the Act's policy
of considering the interest of the public, but while the Commission
achieved this end by substituting its own conception of community of
interest for that of the petitioning organizations, the court has added
a new dimension to unit selection under the Act. With the judicially
added requirement of public interest entering into future unit determinations as a distinct criterion, and a corresponding decrease in
the weight given to employees' articulation of community of interest,
109 Id. (quoting from N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-5.3 (Supp. 1973-74)).
110 64 N.J. at 257, 315 A.2d at 15. In addition, based upon professional employees'
"common interest and character" as well as the similar terms and conditions to be negotiated, the court found that the state's concept of community of interest was not unreasonable. Id. at 257-58, 315 A.2d at 15.
111 In New Jersey, the scope of judicial review of administrative actions is limited.
The supreme court has stated:
If there is any fair argument in support of the course taken [by the administering
agency] or any reasonable ground for difference of opinion . . . the decision is
conclusively legislative, and will not be disturbed unless patently corrupt, arbitrary
or illegal.
Flanagan v. Department of Civil Serv., 29 N.J. 1, 12, 148 A.2d 14, 20 (1959). Similar language
has been used by the federal courts with reference to judicial review. Wheeler-Van Label
Co. v. NLRB, 408 F.2d 613, 617 (2d Cir. 1969).
Moreover, the court, when reviewing the decision of an agency, must afford "due
regard also to the agency's expertise where such expertise is a pertinent factor." Close v.
Kordulak Bros., 44 N.J. 589, 599, 210 A.2d 753, 758 (1965). See also Board of Educ. v. City
Council, 55 N.J. 501, 507-08, 262 A.2d 881, 884 (1970).
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it is clear that more and more employee groups will be frustrated in
seeking bargaining units limited to distinct occupations.
Professional Association indicates that the New Jersey courts will
be hesitant to disturb a PERC unit selection decision. If it is the legislature's intent to permit more diversity in appropriate public sector
bargaining units in order to reflect the employees' preference, it is
clear that more explicit unit selection criteria will have to be legislatively promulgated.
Manuel A. Correia

